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TOBACCO MARKETING

FEDERAL CONTROL OF LEAF TOBACCO
MARKETING
By C. M. EuwvR*
The past two decades have witnessed unprecedented
efforts by the federal government to improve the position of
the farmer in the national economy. The predominant
stimulus for action by the federal government in this direction has been provided by the recognition of the small part
of the price paid by the consumer that goes to the producer.
Recognition of this condition followed close on the heels
of the abnormally low prices to the producer during the
financial depression of the early 1930's.
The case of the tobacco farmer is illustrative of the conditions among the farm commodity growers which have induced the imposition of federal controls.' Even in normal
years the tobacco farmer has received only about one fourth
of the total amount received by domestic manufacturers
from the sale of tobacco products. During the depression
years of 1931 and 1932 the farm value of tobacco amounted
to less than the profits of the manufacturers. The consequence of these conditions in the tobacco industry has been
the enactment of several legislative measures during the
middle 1930's designed to improve prices paid to the tobacco
producer. In addition, the federal Department of Justice
has recently concluded litigation under the Sherman Act
against the tobacco manufacturers in an attempt to improve competitive conditions in the tobacco industry, and,
in particular, to improve the bargaining position of the
farmer in the sale of his tobacco to the manufacturer.'
The legislation designed to assist the tobacco producer
in increasing price has now been in effect for about ten
* Member of Maryland and District of Columbia Bars; A.B. Princeton,
1936; LL. B. Georgetown, 1940; L.L.M. Harvard, 1947.
I See Table I.
That the purpose of assisting the grower seems the chief reason for
the suit is indicated by the statement of government counsel after victory
by the government in the trial court. New York Times (Oct. 28, 1941) 25,
col. 2. "Assistant Attorney General Edward H. Miller said tonight the
conviction of the 'Big Three' tobacco companies and thirteen of their
officials indicated that the jury thought the nations tobacco farmers had
been getting too little for their tobacco as a result of this conspiracy."

MARYLAND

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. IX

years. Such a period would seem sufficiently long to permit observation of the results of the legislation and a fair
appraisal of its effectiveness as a method of solution to the
problem of increasing income to the tobacco farmer. Since
the litigation under the Sherman Act was finally decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States on June 12,
1946, it is perhaps too early to see clearly what the precise
effects of that anti-trust case will be in terms of improved
prices to the farmer. Nevertheless, the use of the Sherman
Act in this connection invites analysis with respect to its
usefulness as a weapon for aiding the tobacco producer in
the elimination of some of the barriers to increased prices.
It is the purpose of this article to examine these efforts
of the federal government with a view to determining
whether they point the way to an effective permanent solution of the problem of adjustment of income from tobacco
products between the producer and the manufacturer, particularly in the light of certain competitive conditions that
exist in the tobacco industry.
THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY

A consideration of the problems in increasing the price
to the grower of leaf tobacco must take into account the
economic characteristics of the tobacco industry itself.
The most important of the economic factors within the industry bearing directly on the price received by the producer are: (1) the major buyers of leaf tobacco are a few
large and powerful domestic tobacco manufacturing corporations, (2) one of the consequences of a small number
of buyers of a crop which has many producers is that a condition known to economists as "monopolistic competition"
exists in the industry, and (3) a second consequence of the
existence of a small number of powerful buyers is that the
sale of tobacco is made by the farmer to the manufacturer
through a buyer controlled method of marketing known as
"loose leaf auction."
The Buyers. By far the greatest part of the tobacco
crop in the United States is used for the manufacture of

1948]

TOBACCO MARKETING

•cigarettes. Nine cigarette manufacturers produce almost
100% of the total cigarettes produced annually in this country. Of these nine manufacturers; three, the American
Tobacco Company, the Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company,
and the Reynolds Tobacco Company produce over 60% of
the annual manufacture. Three other manufacturers, the
Philip Morris Tobacco Company, the Brown and Williamson Tobacco Company, and the P. Lorillard Tobacco Company produce annually about 20% of the annual manufacture. The annual manufacture of the first six tobacco
manufacturers amounts to between 80% and 95% of the
annual cigarette manufacture.3
Of the crops used for cigarette manufacture, the domestic cigarette manufacturers are the principal buyers of
leaf tobacco and their purchases of the annual crop are
roughly in the same proportion as their percentage of
annual cigarette manufacture. So, the American, Liggett
& Myers, and the Reynolds companies purchase annually
over 60% of the annual cigarette leaf crop. In addition to
the manufacture of cigarettes, the same companies manufacture other tobacco products in which they similarly
dominate the field and are the largest buyers of tobacco
leaf.
The domination of the industry by a few corporations
has resulted in the concentration of great power and wealth
in those companies, particularly in the "Big Three," or
American, Liggett & Myers, and Reynolds. As an illustration of their great economic power, the net assets of these
three companies, in terms of the amount by which assets
exceed current liabilities, rose* from $277,000,000 in 1912
to over $551,000,000 in 1939. Their earnings rose from
$28,000,000 in 1912 to over $75,000,000 in 1939." In addition
to their great wealth and holdings they have acquired
highly efficient managements which have developed extensive buying, advertising, manufacturing and selling
organizations.
See Table II.
American Tobacco Co. v. U. S., 328 U. S. 781, 797 (1946).
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Monopolistic Competition. The domination of the tobacco industry by a few large companies has broad implications in the light of certain recent studies in the field of
economic theory.5 Until recently it has been assumed that
economic laws for the setting of industrial prices were
divisible into two categories--on the one hand, where the
price was set by monopolies, and, on the other hand, where
the concepts of supply and demand determined price under
"pure" or "free" market conditions. Actually few, if any,
prices are susceptible of determination by such an easy
classification, and most industrial product prices lie somewhere in the area between what they would have been
under either "pure" competition or monopoly.' Price under the concept of "pure" competition is determined under
the premise that the market includes a large number of
buyers and sellers and that the product is homogeneous.
In a market where these elements exist the price of the
product is not affected by the policies that any one buyer
or seller may adopt, and no isolated change by a seller in
his output can materially affect the market.
The ideal conditions for "pure" competition do not exist
in most irdustrial markets. Certain monopoly elements,
established for example by such media as trade marks,
brand names or advertising, affect price in many markets
where price is ordinarily thought of as being determined
by the laws of supply and demand. Recent economic
studies point out that, where prices are affected by these
factors they are determined by the laws of "monopolistic
competition" rather than the laws of supply and demand
under "pure" competition.'
In the tobacco industry even stronger abnormal economic influences affect price. In markets, where, as in the
tobacco industry, there are only a few buyers and many
sellers, strong monopoly elements exist. In that kind of
market it has been determined that the buying policy of
5 The basic work is CHAMBERLAIN, TIHE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (5th ed. 1946). A collection of the literature on the subject is

contained in

HANDLER, CASES ON TRADE REGULATION

(1936)

331, n. 79.

6 A study of the conditions in industry which have led to this development, as well as its consequences, is made by BURNS, THE DECLINE OF
COMPETITION (1936), passim.
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each of the buyers has a direct and immediate effect upon
the market price, and because of that effect, future market
prices will be affected since rival buyers must make adjustments in their own buying policies as a result. This type.
of market has the result that prices are set under a condition known to economists as "duopoly,"7 which is considered a strong manifestation of "monopolistic competition."
The effect of "duopoly" is that each of the buyers formulates price policy with an eye to the effect of that policy
on the rival buyers and on the market price. The result
of such price policies is that the price set will approach a
monopoly price, and, moreover, that each of the rival
buyers acting separately upon his own knowledge of the
effect of his price policy upon the market and upon
other buyers may arrive at a price which is substantially
identical.
The extent to which price under "duopoly" tends to
be a monopoly price depends, in part, upon the other factors, and their gradations, that also affect price in addition
to the factor of the existence of a small number of buyers
in the market. In the tobacco market, which is generally
recognized as a prime example of duopoly, there can be
no doubt that these factors do affect price. It is as difficult
to find "pure" duopoly as it is to find "pure" competition.
Despite the existence of other factors in the market which
may leaven the effect on price of a small number of buyers,
it seems clear that duopoly is the dominant factor in setting
prices in the tobacco industry.8
7 "Duopoly"
is defined as a market where there are a large number of
buyers and only two sellers. It is also used as a definition in the converse
situation, where there are a large number of sellers and only two buyers.
"Oligopoly" is the economic definition for a market where similar conditions exist and there are a small number, but more than two, sellers (or
buyers). Since the conditions in the tobacco industry more nearly approach
those of "duopoly" that the more Inclusive but less exact "Oligopoly", the
former term will be used to describe the condition of the tobacco market
although from a technical economic sense the latter might more properly be
used. HANDLER, op. cit., supra, n. 5; CHAMBERLAIN, op. cit., sipra, n. 5,
30-53. Some writers have discussed the same general problems under the
designation of "administered" prices. See, Means, Industrial Prices and
their Relative Inflexibility, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., Sen. Doc. 13 (1935).
8Cox, COMPETITION IN THE AMERICAN TOBACCO INDUSTRY (1933) 176,
et seq.
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The Loose Leaf Auction Market.9 By far the largest
percentage of the annual tobacco crop is sold by the farmer
to the manufacturer through the loose leaf auction method
of marketing. There are about 150 loose leaf markets, and
they are distributed throughout the areas where tobacco
is grown."0 The term "market" designates a town where
tobacco is sold. In the market there are warehouses within which tobacco is sold." The warehouses are privately
owned. Their business consists of marketing the tobacco of
the producer to the manufacturer for a fee which is based
on a percentage of the sale price. The policy of the market
on sales and the dates of the opening and closing of the
market season are determined by the local tobacco board of
trade which is an association of the warehousemen of the
locality and of the buyers.
The sale of the tobacco is made in these warehouses. 2
Before the grower brings the tobacco to the market, he
grades it according to his ideas of quality by separating
and placing together all leaves of a like quality. At the
warehouse the tobacco of the grower is placed in open baskets, or "burdens," each basket containing all tobacco of
the same quality according to the growers grading. The
baskets of tobacco are arranged in long rows in the warehouse along with the tobacco of others growers. When
the auction sale begins, representatives of the buyers, a
representative of the warehouse and an auctioneer employed by the warehouse proceed along the row. An inThe origins of the auction method are not clear. It is at least certain
that it has been in existence for 95 years. Department of Commerce, Office
of the National Recovery Administration, The Tobacco Study, (March
1936) 105.
10 See Table III.
11 The number of warehouses may vary from one In the smaller markets
to twenty in Lexington and Louisville, Ky. See U. S. Department of Agriculture, Annual Report on Tobacco Statistics, December 1945, Table 6,
p. 27.
12 A brief description of the auction method is contained in the opinion
of the Circuit Court of Appeals in American Tobacco Co. v. U. S., 147
F. (2d) 93, 100 (C.C.A. 6th, 1944). More complete descriptions are contained in Brief for the Petitioner, Liggett & Myers Co. in the Supreme
Court, in the same case at p. 15, and, also, In the brief for the Reynolds Co.
in the same Court at p. 25. See also Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U. S. 441,
445-446 (1937), and also the report of the Committee on Agriculture of the
House of Representatives to accompany H. R. 826. H. Rep. No. 1102, 74th
Cong. 1st Sess. (1933), reprinted at p. 115 in the Record in the Supreme
Court of the United States In Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1 (1939).
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dividual sale is made of each basket. The representative
of the warehouse makes the opening bid, and the bids of
the buyers are chanted by the auctioneer. The bids are
made by gestures, the wink of an eye, or other movements
known to the auctioneer. They are not made orally. The
sales proceed very rapidly-at the rate of about 400 baskets
an hour. The grower is given a short time to reject the bid
if he feels that it is not high enough. The time within
which the bid must be rejected varies according to the
rules of the particular market. It may be as short as thirty
minutes. If the bid is rejected, the grower may place his
tobacco elsewhere in the warehouse where it is bid upon
when the buying party reaches that part of the row. In
the event that the farmer again wishes to reject the bid
the rules of the market ordinarily require that the grower
remove the tobacco to another warehouse. If the farmer
accepts the bid, he is paid immediately.
The market as described has characteristics that operate
to the detriment of the grower and place him in an unequal
bargaining position.18 While some of these conditions are
subject to the controls of the federal government which
are later discussed, many of them are still prevalent in the
auction markets. 14 The more important of these characteristics are:
1. No recognized standard of grading. Each crop of
tobacco varies widely in quality, and consequently in the
amount that each of the types of that crop will bring on the
market. In the absence of a standard grading system, a
wide range of prices is possible in tobacco of identical
IS While this paper deals only with the federal controls exercised to
improve the position of the farmer, it is interesting to note that no state
has enacted comprehensive legislation dealing with recognized evils in
tobacco marketing. In only one of them, for example, has. any attempt been
made to deal with the rapidity of sales. Maryland limits the number of
sales per hour to 360 baskets. This figure Is apparently taken from the old
N. R. A. code. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, National Recovery Administration,
The Tobacco Study (March, 1936) 105. Md. Code supp. (1947) Art. 48,
Sec. 59D. See also, Research Report No. 10, Research Division, Maryland
Legislative Council, Tobacco Marketing in Maryland (1942).
1, Discussions of the conditions In the auction market for leaf tobacco
are found in Scanlan and Tinley, Business Analysis of the Tobacco Growers
Association, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, Cir. No. 100 (Oct. 1929), 10; U. S.
Federal Trade Commission, The American Tobacco Company and the
Imperial Tobacco Company, Sen. Doc. No. 34, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926) 20.
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quality. This disparity of price for the same quality may
exist between markets, and it may even exist within the
same market. Buyers are under instructions to purchase
a designated number of pounds at an average price. In
the process of "averaging out" purchases, it is inevitable
that the same quality of tobacco will bring varying prices.
So also, the speed at which the auction is conducted, the
difference in lighting conditions, and other factors affect
the judgment of the bidder as to each offering of tobacco
and contribute a wide range of price for tobacco of the
same quality.
2. Discrimination between sellers as a result of intimacy between warehousemen and buyers. Large growers
whose continued patronage is desired by the warehouse
may induce favored treatment for them at the instance of
the warehouse and at the expense of other growers. This
favoritism is made possible by the close relationship that
exists between the warehouse and the buyers.
3. Short marketing season. The tobacco marketing
season for the major crops opens in Georgia about August 1
and moves progressively northward ending in Kentucky
or Tennessee sometime in April or May. 15 As a consequence, the grower of each crop of tobacco has a comparatively short time within which to market his crop. The
shortness of the season frequently causes a rush to market
tobacco causing "glutted" markets, depressed prices, and
congested markets making it difficult to find a warehouse
which will handle the sale. The dates of the opening and
the closing of the markets are largely controlled by the
large manufacturers through their membership on the
tobacco boards of trade.
The practical result is that the farmer must market his
crop during the short time the loose leaf market is open
or not at all. Tobacco, in the hands of the producer, is a
perishable crop, for it can be stored only by a process
known as "redrying," which requires expensive equipment not ordinarily available to the farmer. On the other
hand, the manufacturers maintain large inventories-about
15 U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, Annual Report on Tobacco Statistics 1945,
(Dec. 1945).
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3 years supply-which is kept in condition by redrying
equipment. The maintainance of large inventories makes
the manufacturer independent of the necessity for purchasing a crop every year and is a prime weapon for successfully resisting a refusal of the producers to sell because of
low prices.
4. Rapidity of sales. In most of the markets, sales are
made at the average of about 400 baskets an hour. In some
of them sales have been made at a rate of over 500 baskets
an hour. Some of the tobacco trade associations which
govern the policies of the markets with respect to sales
require that there be a certain number of sales an hour.
The result of this pressure on the buyers is that they must
make a hasty appraisal of the quality of tobacco. Speed
of sales contributes to the wide variations in prices paid for
the same quality of tobacco.
5. Inadequate lighting. Color is one of the most important qualities in the judging of the value of tobacco.
Since there is no uniformity of. lighting conditions in the
various warehouses, tobacco of the same quality may be
sold at different prices. The hurried buyer can not guess
at the possible good quality of tobacco, but must protect
himself by bidding at a low figure.
6. Small markets. There are still a number of small
markets which are not important enough to justify a separate set of buyer representatives of the manufacturing
companies. In these markets, the companies purchase
through local agents. Under such circumstances, it is possible for local buyers and warehousemen to combine for the
purpose of depressing prices by jointly buying in tobacco
for resale at a higher price.
7. Unfair trade practices. (a) Subsidized trucking. In
most cases the producer must hire a trucker for the transport of his produce to market. In addition to the fee paid
to the drayer by the farmer, a fee may be paid by the warehouse for delivery to that warehouse. Where the producer
does not designate a specific warehouse it is common for
the drayer to shop among the warehouses for the delivery
of the tobacco to the warehouse offering the highest fee.
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Drayers also have demanded a fee for the placing of the
tobacco in a prominent place in the warehouse where it will
be promptly sold. (b) Rebating. Warehousemen have
occasionally engaged in the practice of giving rebates to
prominent growers. (c) Reservation of floor space. Large
growers have often been favored by the warehousemen by
permitting them to reserve floor space.
The foregoing characteristics of the tobacco industry
raise serious problems in connection with the approach to
control the federal government has taken through legislation and anti-trust litigation.
FEDERAL LEGISLATION CONTROLLING
TOBACCO MARKETING1 6

The interest of the federal government in the prices
received by the grower for leaf tobacco began as a result
of depressed leaf prices following the first World War, 7
"The only major tobacco legislation not covered in this section is that
dealing with cooperatives.
The federal government has been active in the support of cooperatives
for the marketing of commodities, including tobacco, and has enacted legislation for the purpose of aiding cooperatives by means of loans of funds,
12 U. S. C. A. (1929) 1441, et seq. The history of the tobacco cooperatives
has been an interesting one, see Cox, op. cit., supra, n. 8, 165-175, also
Scanlon and Tinley, op. cit.. supra, u. 14, 88, particularly in view of the
assertion of the companies at the anti-trust trial that the companies used
the auction method of loose leaf marketing simply because it was the inherited method and because of its convenience to the grower.
Following the first World War the drop in leaf prices led to dissatisfaction with the method of marketing and caused the initiation of a number of cooperative associations. Of the seven associations which in 1923
handled 46% of the crop, only two were in existence in 1930, see BusiN-Ess
W x, Oct. 15, 1930. 27. The only major cooperative still in existence is
the Maryland Tobacco Growers Cooperative Association. The introduction
of the loose leaf auction method of marketing in Maryland in 1939 has
resulted in the practical elimination of the Maryland Cooperative as a
major method of marketing of Maryland tobacco. This result was brought
about by offering substantially higher prices on the loose leaf market until
the effectiveness of the cooperative market as a successful competitor was
eliminated. The large tobacco companies are the major bidders on both
markets. In this connection it is interesting to note that the Maryland
Cooperative offered facilities for "redrying" the members' tobacco and its
indefinite storage. Maryland tobacco is considered a necessary component
to cigarette mixtures because of its burning qualities. See, Tobacco Marketing in Maryland, op. cit., sflpra, n. 13, 22, et seq.
17 The United States Warehouse Act, 7 U. S. C. A. (1916) 241, is an indication of the interest of the federal government prior to this time. The
act provides for regulation of tobacco warehouses under the Secretary of
Agriculture through licensing on the basis of financial responsibility, and
regulation of amount of fees that may be charged by warehousemen for
sales. The code is contained in 7 C. F. R., Sec. 1031, et seq.
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and the agitation of the growers and their associations for
elimination of the conditions in the industry which they
believed to be the cause of the low prices. It was widely
felt by the growers that the cause of low prices was collusion among the buyers with respect to their purchases of
leaf. These complaints by the growers led to three investigations by the Federal Trade Commission and resulted in
reports by that body to the Congress in 1920, 1922, and
1925.18 While the conclusions of the Commission were unfavorable in tone to the manufacturers, the reports emphasized that the low prices received by the grower were
not specifically caused by action of the manufacturers but
that the causes were to be found in economic factors due
to conditions prevailing after the war. 9 Although the reports did not immediately result in legislation, they served
to highlight conditions in the industry and certain practices of the manufacturers.
The first specific legislation was passed in 1929.20 It
provided, in effect, for the supplying of information to the
Secretary of Agriculture as to the stocks of tobacco on
hand by the major manufacturing companies. The effect
of this act was merely informational and resulted in no
specific controls affecting either practices in the industry
or prices to the grower.
The first years of the New Deal brought two acts which
were concerned with both marketing practices and leaf
prices. A code of fair practices was issued for tobacco
warehousemen under the National Industrial Recovery
Act 2 ' and a subsidy acreage quoto system for growers was
put into effect for tobacco under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.22 Soon thereafter, in 1935, the Tobacco
18U. S. Federal Trade Commission, Report on the Tobacco Industry
(1920); U. S. Federal Trade Commission, Prices of Tobacco Products
(1922); U. S. Federal Trade Commission, The American Tobacco Company and The Imperial Tobacco Company, Sen. Doe. No. 34, 69th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1926). See discussion ,of these investigations in Cox, op. cit.,
supra, n. 8, 161-167.
19 Cox, op. cit., supra, n. 8,161.
20 7 U. S. C. A. (1929) Sec. 501.
2148 Stat. 195 (1933) (repealed].
22 7 U. S. C. A. (1933) 601, ct seq. The Kerr-Smith Act, 48 Stat. 1275
(1934) [repealed], was a companion a-t to the AAA of 1933 providing for
taxes upon the sales of producers who did not participate in the program
for reducing production.
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Inspection Act of 193523 was passed by the Congress and
became effective. This act established a system of uniform
federal grading of leaf tobacco and provided for the placing of information in the hands of the grower which would
enable the grower to exercise better judgment in the accepting or rejecting of bids on his leaf tobacco at auction.
The unconstitutionality of the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Agricultural Act of 1933 eliminated the
two most important acts from the point of view of the
tobacco grower. 24 In 1936 the Tobacco Control Act 25 was
passed. It was designed to replace the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 by establishing a quota system for growers
based on interstate compact and a close cooperation between the compacting states and the federal Secretary of
Agriculture. This act was never utilized because the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 193826 was passed before the
Tobacco Control Act had received the state action necessary to make it effective. The Agricultural Adjustment
28 7 U. S. C. A. (1935) Sec. 511, et seq. The constitutionality of the Act
was sustained by the Supreme Court in Currin v. Wallace, supra, n. 12.
2, The National Industrial Recovery Act was held unconstitutional in
Schechter v. United States. 295 U. S. 495 (1935). The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 511 (1936). The Kerr-Smith Act was
declared unconstitutionalT. in Glenn v. Smith, 91 F. (2d) 447 (C.C.A. 6th,
1937), cert. denied. 303 I S. 657 (1938), and the act was repealed.
25 7 U. S. C. A. (1936) Sec. 515.
Following the decision in the Butler case, the Congress in an attempt to
provide crop control without constitutional objection passed an act authorizing the states to enter into compacts with respect to the establishment
of quotas and also for the regulation of marketing, i. e.. Tobacco Control
Act. Pursuant to the compact Virginia passed an act which was in accordance with the general conference agreement reached between the states
as to the form and content of the State Act necessary to provide for the
regulation and marketing of tobacco, see Va. Code Ann. (1942) Sec.
1399(1) et seq. The Act was, however, contingent upon the enactment of
similar legislation in the other states where tobacco of the same type was
grown. Kentucky (Ky. Rev. Stat. (1943) Sec. 248.010 et seq.) and North
Carolina (N. C. Gen. Stat. (1944) Art. 42, Sec. 106-471 et seq.) eventually
enacted legislation but it never became effective since it. too. was dependent on the enactment of legislation in states growing the same type
of tobacco. Inaction by the states of South Carolina, Georgia, Ohio, Connecticut. and Pennsylvania has prevented the legislation from becoming
effective. Although the acts have never been repealed, their purpose has
been largely effectuated by the AAA of 1938, 7 U. S. C. A. (1938) Sec.
1281, et seq. The compact device is plainly an awkward one if the same
effect can be produced by an act of Congress which does not run into the
constitutional objections.
26 7 U. S. C. A. (1938) Sec. 1281, et seq. The constitutionality of the Act
was sustained by the Supreme Court in Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38
(1939).
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Act of 1938 adopted the quota device of its predecessor, the
AAA of 1933, without the objectionable constitutional feature of the processing tax and subsidies to the grower for
crop reduction.
With the exception of the Price Control Act of 1942,27
which is no longer in effect for leaf tobacco, these legislative measures are the only acts of the Congress which have
been directly concerned with leaf tobacco. Of these statutes, the Tobacco Inspection Act and the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938 constitute the principal legislative
measures with respect to leaf marketing.
The Tobacco Inspection Act. The Tobacco Inspection
Act provides for the inspection and grading of leaf tobacco
before sale. In addition, it provides for placing information in the hands of the grower which will better enable
him to exercise judgment as to whether to reject or accept
bids for his tobacco in sales by auction.
As has been discussed2 8 certain practices of the market
without a uniform inspection system operate to the disadvantage of the grower with respect to his bargaining
position. Leaf tobacco is sold very rapidly. The average
is often more than one basket every ten seconds, or about
400 baskets an hour. Under such conditions it is very
difficult even for expert buyers to properly appraise the
tobacco being sold and give an accurate bid that is near the
actual worth of the tobacco. Different lighting conditions
and the policies of the companies in "averaging out" sales
also contribute to the wide range of prices offered for tobacco of the same quality. The result is that, even in the
same market, the same quality of tobacco is sold at different
prices.
" 56 Stat. 23, 50 App. U. S. C. A. (1942) Sec. 901 (Supp. V, 1946).
Pursuant to the provisions of the act the Administrator issued price
regulations limiting the amount that could be paid for leaf tobacco. For
most of the crops of tobacco, this limitation was in the form of a maximum
price per grade. The grades for this purpose were the grades established
by the Secretary of Agriculture under the Tobacco Inspection Act, supra,
n. 23. The administrator also issued regulations covering the amount that
could be charged by dealers for their services in the sale of leaf tobacco
Regulations issued by the administrator in respect to leaf tobacco were
numerous and are not here cited. A fair example in respect to burley
tobacco is Maximum Price Regulation 283, 7 F. R. 10224, as amended
April 12, 1943. The general effects of the control may be seen in Table IV.
2 Circa, n. 13.
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In the second place, under the rules of the markets,
the grower must exercise his right to reject the bid within
a very short time. In some cases this right must be exercised within thirty minutes. Without some means of information as to the market price for his grades of tobacco,
the seller must compete in the sale with buyers who are
completely informed by their company as to the current
market prices, and who are experts in judging the grades
of tobacco. The only ways the farmer can gather information as to the current market price is by examining the
price received for other tobacco in the warehouse (and this
must be done quickly for the tobacco on which bids have
been accepted is removed from the floor immediately after
the sale) and compare it with his own as to quality, or
through discussion with his friends.
The Act provides for correcting these conditions by two
procedures: (1) Grading of all tobacco in markets which
are designated by the Secretary of Agriculture, and (2)
Posting in the warehouse information received by the
government as to the average market price for each of the
grades of tobacco for both daily and weekly average prices.
(1) The Act provides for the designation by the Secretary of Agriculture of markets where the sales of tobacco
are made in interstate commerce. Following the designation the Act provides for a local referendum to be held
by the growers who have sold in that market during the
past marketing season. The issue determined by the referendum is whether or not free government grading service
is desired. Following favorable action by the growers in
the referendum, federal tobacco inspectors are sent to the
market, who grade each basket of tobacco into one of the
grades established by the Secretary of Agriculture. The
inspectors sample each of the baskets and mark the government grade on the label accompanying each basket.
(2) At thesame time the agents of the government post
in the warehouse the average price received for each of
the government grades in the same market the day before,
and also publish weekly -summaries with respect to the
prices received in the market for each of the government
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grades. At the time of the auction the seller is then in possession of information as to the grade of his tobacco and
the price which he should receive for it. With this information the buyer can determine whether the bid made for
his tobacco is in accordance with the prices prevailing in
the market.
Effect of the Inspection Act on leaf prices. It is difficult
to isolate the effect the Inspection Act has had on leaf
prices. In the first place, there are factors other than the
Act that affect the market price. In addition to the normal
factors affecting price there are certain artificial factors
in the form of other legislative attempts to raise the price
to the farmer-for example, the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1938. Further, it was not until about 1941-194229
that inspection coverage became general as to all markets.
At the time coverage became general leaf tobacco prices
began to move upward but this effect is undoubtedly largely
due to other factors; the major one being increased demand due to the war. No comparison is possible between
those markets having government inspection and those
which did not, even assuming that both were selling the
same type of tobacco. The reason for this is that it is impossible to tell what grades of tobacco are being sold on
the market that does not have government grading since
the market would have no grading system comparable to
the government system.
General acceptance of the compulsory grading system 0
by the farmers through favorable voting on the referendum
provision of the act indicates their belief that the system
has assisted them in receiving better prices than they could
have received without such an act. Probably the effect of
the act is that it decreases the range of prices within a grade
so that prices received for each grade are about the same,
but it is doubtful that it increases the average prices for
leaf tobacco which would have prevailed had the act not
been passed.
29

See Table III.

80 Ibid.
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The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.31 The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 is the successor to the ill
fated AAA, and like its predecessor is designed to increase
income to the producer through the much controverted
device of control of the supply of tobacco through crop
control. The 1938 Act applies only to a limited number of
commodities, of which tobacco is one. The Act contains
provisions with respect to crop quota controls of the various crops of tobacco and makes the imposition of crop controls for each growing year dependent on the size of the
inventories of the major companies.
The purpose of the Act is to increase tobacco leaf prices
by giving the producer increased bargaining power by
limiting the supply of leaf tobacco and decreasing the size
of the inventories in the hands of the major companies.
As has been discussed 2 the size of the inventories of the
tobacco manufacturers has always been a potent factor
in the superior bargaining position of the manufacturing
companies. By maintaining large inventories, usually
about three years supply, the manufacturing companies are
able to minimize the danger of a refusal by the growers to
sell because of low prices. Coupled with large inventories
is the fact that tobacco in the hands of the producer is a
perishable crop. These factors combine effectively to strip
the farmer of his major weapons for price increases.
Under the Act the Secretary of Agriculture is empowered to declare a national marketing quota for any crop
when he finds that the "total supply of tobacco" exceeds
the "reserve supply level". These are terms of art and are
specifically defined. "Total supply of tobacco" is defined
as being the quantity of tobacco on hand at the beginning
of the marketing year plus the estimated production during
the calendar year in which the marketing year begins.
The "reserve supply level" is defined as the normal years
domestic consumption (to be determined by finding the
average quantity consumed during the past ten years) plus
exports plus 175 percent of a normal years domestic con81 Supra, n.

26.
32 Circa, n. 15.
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sumption and 65 percent of a normal years exports. An
additional 5% is added to the total. The effect of these provisions is to limit the supply by quotas when the inventories of the large companies reach a figure roughly twice
the average amount of tobacco consumed annually for the
past ten years.
After the finding by the Secretary that a national
marketing quota is justified, a referendum is held among
the farmers of the crop subject to the quota. If two thirds
of the farmers subject to the quota vote in approval, the
Secretary announces the quota and it is effective thereafter.
Under the Act the Secretary then allocates the quota
among the several states on the basis of the production of
tobacco in those states during the five years immediately
preceding the year for which the quota is to be effective.
Local committees apportion the state quota among the producers within the state on the basis of past acreage, and
other considerations of lesser importance.
A penalty is provided for the marketing of any tobacco
in excess of the quota. In the case of flue cured, Maryland
and Burley the penalty is 100 per pound, and in the case
of all other tobaccos is 5¢ per pound. If the tobacco is
marketed through a warehouse, which is, of course, the
usual case, the penalty is paid by the warehouseman, who
is allowed to deduct an amount equivalent to the penalty
from the price paid to the producer. If the transfer is made
other than through a warehouse, the penalty is paid by the
transferee, who may deduct it from the price paid to the
producer in the case that the transfer is made by sale.
Effect of the AAA of 1938 on leaf prices. As in the case
of the Tobacco Inspection Act it is difficult to isolate the
effect of the AAA of 1938 on prices to the producer. These
difficulties exist because of the same factors, both artificial
and natural, bearing on the price as were considered in the
discussion of the Tobacco Inspection Act. Further, the
first effects of the AAA of 1938 would have become apparent during 1940-1945." This period can, of course, af83Table IV.
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ford no reliable index to the effect of the Act since the
period is substantially affected by the increased demand
for tobacco products due to war conditions.
It is notable that during the war tobacco remained the
only commodity subject to the control of the act on which
crop controls remained in effect. 4 While the controls remained in effect, wartime demand skyrocketed, and as a
consequence the manufacturers for the first time apparently felt that their carefully accumulated inventories
were imperiled. 5 The fear of reduction of this potent
weapon caused agitation by the manufacturers for the lifting of crop controls,3 6 which was met by counter proposals
for the continuance of crop controls on tobacco even if
total supply became less than the reserve supply level
under the Act.37 This condition was never reached and as a
result the crop controls remained in effect.
The companies' solicitude for the inviolability of their
accumulated inventories causes speculation as to the cause
of the tobacco "shortages" during the war. Whether this
"shortage" was caused by the refusal of the major companies to release their backlogs of inventories for current
production and risk their permanent loss as a result of the
proposed legislation or their reduction to the levels provided in the Act is a subject for future investigation.
84N. Y. Times (Oct. 12, 1943) 1, col. 4, Tobacco Alone on Crop Cut List
in 1944 Program.
85It should be noted that increased consumption of tobacco in the war
years does not affect the lifting of crop controls under the act except to
the extent It raises the average consumption for the period on which determination of the "reserve supply level" is based.
'1n Tobacco, 42 Time (Oct. 25, 1943) 80, It was said: "Behind the shortage talk some officials saw a shrewd attempt by the manufacturers to
knock out crop control of tocacco, probably the only crop which will be
restricted next year. By and large, growers back crop control even now,
fearing a swamped market and depressed prices in the post war years, and
there is grave doubt whether knocking off all quotas would naturally increase planting. Acreage allotments have been steadily upped for three
years, including a 20% hop for next year, but manpower and fertilizer
shortages have kept planting below quotas." Also see, N. Y. Times (Oct.
13, 1943 25, col. 3, "Cigarette Famine in 20 months due to Tobacco Crop
Curb is Seen."
27N. Y. Times (Oct. 12, 1943) 1, col. 4, ' The demand for tobacco has
been so large in relation to the supply that, under the existing law, there
was no longer any legal grounds for the imposition of marketing quotas
on the flue cured and burley quotas. Under such circumstances a simple
resolution authorizing the imposition of quotas without regard to the
demand and supply situation was introduced into Congress."
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In any event, wartime history makes it reasonably clear
that the act has failed to reduce materially the inventories
of the major companies. As in the case of the Tobacco Inspection Act farmers have voted favorably on referendums
making the Act effective, which indicates their belief that
it increases price. The extent to which it does tend to such
increases is not measurable, but it seems clear that in view
of the economic conditions in the market the tendency will
never be strong enough to cause price increases against
the will of the buyers.
Existing federal legislation as a means of increasing
leaf prices. It appears obvious that existing federal legislation is based upon the supposition that "pure" competition
exists in the tobacco industry. Under such an approach
the hypothesis of the government apparently is that the
function of legislation is to insure the preservation of the
freedom of the market by regulating those practices which
interfere with its freedom. The supposition is, in the case
of the Tobacco Inspection Act, that by giving the producer market information which is the equivalent of that
in the possession of the buyer will place the seller in an
equal bargaining position with the buyer so that the price
paid will be the "free" market price determined by the
familiar laws of supply and demand. So also, in the case
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, it is supposed
that the inevitable consequence of lowering the supply
while the demand remains constant is an increase in price.
The immutability of these economic laws may be at least
questioned in the tobacco industry where it is generally
agreed that other economic factors resulting in "monopolistic competition" of which "duopoly" is a manifestation are
controlling.
In a duopoly market the bargaining position of the producer is not appreciably improved where he is given better
market information. The "ceiling" price for each grade
is nevertheless set by the buyers under the economic factors applying under "duopoly" rather than free market
conditions. So also, control of supply does not necessarily
mean increased price in the "duopoly" market. Even if
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the price is increased, the increase is due to the action of
the buyers under "duopoly" conditions rather than the
effect of a limitation of the supply on a free market. Where
the power remains in the buyers to set the price rather
than the economic laws affecting a free market, a limitation of supply might not result in an increased price to
the producer at all but could well result in an industrial
policy maintaining the margin of net profit to the manufacturer through a decrease in production and increased
price to the retailer and dealer.
It seems clear that the basic fallacy of existing federal
legislation on the subject of tobacco marketing is in the
assumption that the tobacco market will react to the same
stimuli that affect price in a "pure" competitive market.
Until recognition is made in legislation that the conditions
under which a "duopoly" market operate are fundamentally different from those in a free market, it appears that
legislation on the subject of tobacco marketing will do
little to increase the price of leaf tobacco to the producer.
A second comment on the existing system of federal
control of tobacco marketing may be directed to the fact
that, in addition to failing to recognize the underlying
issues, the system is not even comprehensive in its coverage of the acknowledged evils in practices in the market
affecting the bargaining position of the producer and the
prices he receives for his produce. The present coverage of
the statutes extends only to the provisions discussed dealing with uniform federal inspection and, secondly, with
control of manufacturers inventories through supply limitations. It seems clear that the commerce clause of the
Constitution provides a constitutional basis for the extension of existing legislation to make provision for control of those other practices adversely affecting the bargaining position of the producer and leaf prices.38
88 The fact that comprehensive legislation has not been enacted by the
States makes the need for federal action even more clear. For the most
part state legislation has been confined to regulation of warehouses and
the fees which warehousemen may exact for sales. As an example of such
legislation see Townsend v. Yeomans, 8upra., n. 12. Such regulation is
largely a duplication of similar federal regulation, see supra, n. 17.
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SHERMAN ACT LITIGATION AFFECTING TOBACCO MARKETING

Perhaps more than in any other industry, the practices
of the tobacco industry have been subject to the surveillance of the agencies of the federal government charged
with responsibility for the enforcement of the Sherman

Act.Ba Investigation of these practices has led to a major
anti-trust action under the Sherman Act against the in-

dustry in each of the last two generations.3 9 To those
concerned with the problems of leaf marketing the first
of these actions, which ended in 1911, has little more than
historical significance. That action was a civil suit brought
by the government against the old tobacco trust and resulted in its dissolution. Under the guidance of the court,
the industry was continued through the formation of new
companies and the continuance of some of the old mem-

bers of the trust.
In that litigation, the leaf buying practices of the
trust did not constitute a major issue of the case. There
the vice of the trust was that because of its size, which
had come about by design of those in control through
predatory practices and other means of acquiring control,
it exercised monopolistic control of the industry. The decree of the court had for its purpose, by dissolution of the
old trust into a number of companies, the "restoration" of
''competition" in the industry.
3 15 U. S. C. A. (1890) 1, et seq.
19 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106 (1911). The
most complete treatment of the case is in Cox, supra, n. 8. The best short
treatment of the background and issues of the case is HANDLER, Industrial
Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws, (1932) 32 Col. L. Rev. 179, 197, et seq.
In the period from 1890 to 1910 the American Tobacco Company, originally a consolidation of five cigarette companies, extended its control
throughout the entire industry, until it was unchallenged in the manu-

facture of tobacco products and related activities. Its dominance came
about by various forms of corporate combinations and predatory practices
for the purpose of driving competitors out of business, including price
wars and agreements not to compete. The intention to monopolize was clear
and the court ordered its dissolution in a civil suit brought by the government under the Sherman Act. The decrees of dissolution were prepared
by the court after hearings in which all the interested parties expressed
their views on the proposed decree. The trust was dissolved and 14 successor companies formed, among them the major defendants in the 1940
case. Although the decree was bitterly attacked by the independent companies through their attorneys the court nevertheless approved it. In the
twenty years subsequent to the decree the tremendous growth of cigarette
consumption resulted in the dominance of the "Big Three" of the industry.
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That the decree in the 1911 suit did not effectively restore competitive conditions in the industry gradually became apparent through the investigations of government
agencies 0 and independent scholars, 4' and eventually led
to another action 42 against the industry under the Sherman
Act. This last litigation came to its conclusion with the
decision of the Supreme Court in American Tobacco Company v. U. S."3 on June 12, 1946 affirming the judgment
of the lower court and, by so doing, upholding the conviction of the major segements of the tobacco industry.
American Tobacco Co. v. U. S. This important litigation against the tobacco industry was brought by the government by means of a criminal information." The defendants were named to be the American Tobacco Company, the Reynolds Tobacco Company, the Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Company, the P. Lorillard Tobacco Company, the
Imperial Tobacco Company, the British American Tobacco
Company, the Philip Morris Tobacco Company, the Universal Leaf Tobacco Company, and subsidiaries and officers of those companies. All of the defendants except
American, Reynolds, and Liggett & Myers and the individual officers of those companies were served pursuant to a
stipulation permitting them to enter a plea of nolo contendere upon the condition that they would be fined if
those who stood trial were convicted."5
40.

*

Supra, n. 18.

,1Cox, op. cit., supra, n. 8, passim; JoNES, THE TRUST PROBLEM IN TE

UNITED STATES (1924) 452-474; SEAGE
IOx

PROBLEMS

(1929)

173-191;

and GULICK. TRUST AND CORPORA-

STEVENS,

INDUSTRIAL

COMBINATIONS AND

TRUSTS (1914) 472-516.
2N. Y. Times (July 25, 1940) 19, col. 8, "The Department of Justice
said Its investigation convinced it that a 1911 civil suit by which the
American Tobacco companies business was divided among the Big Four
and divorced from the British concerns named in todays charges did not
suffice to restore free competition and that the Sherman Act is today being
violated in numerous respects by the companies and individuals."
"3American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781 (1946).
"The criminal information constitutes a novel method for bringing antitrust litigation and this case is apparently the first in which it has been
used. Note, Information and Indictment Under the Sherman Act (1945),
54 Yale L. J. 707.
5 Following the action of the Supreme Court sustaining the lower court
these defendants were fined a total of $42,000. See BuSINEs WEEK, October 5, 1946, 54.
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The information. The information46 against the defendants was in four counts. These alleged, in summary, (1)
A conspiracy to restrain trade and commerce in leaf
tobacco and tobacco products, (2) monopolization, (3) attempt to monopolize, and (4) conspiracy to monopolize.
The first of the counts was laid under Section 141 of the
Sherman Act, and the other three were laid under Section
248 of the Sherman Act.
Each of the counts alleged that the crime was committed by the same methods, means, and practices. The focal
points of the information, and, indeed, of the entire case,
were that the defendants agreed on the price that they
would pay for leaf tobacco and, secondly, that they agreed
on the price of tobacco products to the dealers and retailers. With respect to the leaf prices each of the counts alleged that the crime was committed by (1) concertedly
obtaining control of the system under which leaf tobacco
was sold and exercising that control in a manner designed
to deprive tobacco growers of bargaining power, and (2)
agreeing upon and manipulating leaf prices and formulating their grades, buying instructions, and products to
avoid competition among themselves and to restrain competition from others, particularly 10€ cigarettes.
Trial in the District Court. During the trial the government in supporting the allegations with respect to leaf
"I Brief for the Respondent, supra, n. 43, 6 ot seq.
'7

Supra, n. 38a:
"Every contract, combination, in the form of a trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal ...
Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in any
such combination or conspiracy . . . shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine
not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments in the discretion of
the court."

"Ibid., Sec. 2:
"Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and,
on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five
thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court."

156
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buying introduced evidence indicating that the following
4
practices were prevalent in the industry: 1
(1) Identical leaf price instructions to buyers. Evidence as to this practice was almost entirely circumstantial." The companies admitted that each issued price instructions to their buyers for each grade of tobacco, but
there was no direct evidence that these prices were fixed
in concert or by agreement among the companies. The
government contended that the fact that they were made
by agreement could be inferred from certain practices in
the market. In the first place, it contended, it was evident that a leaf price "ceiling" fixed by the companies
exists in the auction market as to each of the grades of
tobacco. Evidence showed that a bid made at this alleged
"ceiling" brought about an immediate sale to the buyer
making the bid even though it was the first bid. Further
support was found in the fact that a "ceiling" bid at any
time on a basket of tobacco not then under auction resulted in its immediate sale to the buyer making the bid.
In addition, the government contended that the inference that identical price instructions to buyers were issued was reflected in the grading system practices of the
defendants. Each of the defendants was found to have
formulated minutely different grades for the tobacco that
they used in their products. In the market these grades
are not competitive among the buyers. Even though the
defendants did not compete as to these grades, there was
evidence that the buyer representatives of non-competing
defendants bid on those grades in order to force the price
to their rivals up to the agreed 'ceiling" price.
The government contended that a variation of that
practice also supported the inference of identical price
instructions. Evidence was introduced showing that a
for the Respondent, op. cit., supra, n. 43, 7.
Evidence showed that immediately prior to the opening of the loose
leaf marketing season, which opened in Georgia. each of the defendant
companies sent the heads of their leaf buying departments to Valdosta,
Georgia, one of the Georgia markets, at the same time. The same meeting
occurs in Lexington before the opening of the burley market. No price
agreement among these representatives was proved. Transcript of Record,
supra, n. 43, 5776.
4 'Brief
5o
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company which had purchased all the tobacco it desired
on the particular market nevertheless continued to bid for
the purpose of forcing rival companies up to the ceiling.
(2) Percentage buying. Another practice of the companies found by the government to have consequences that
resulted in violation of the act is that of "percentage buying." Evidence showed that each of the buyers of the companies received instructions as to the percentage of the
tobacco in each market that they were to purchase for
their principal. The companies admit that such instructions are given, but differ with the government in the
inference to be drawn from them. The companies contended that it was merely for the purpose of assuring
that they receive sufficient tobacco to meet their production requirements. The government contended that such
an arrangement smacked of market sharing, especially
upon the showing by the government that the companies
were able to purchase their predetermined share of the
market within their price determination no matter what
the size of the crop for any given year.
(3) Buyer Control of the Market. The government introduced evidence tending to show that none of the companies would purchase on a market unless all of their
major competitors were also represented. It was further
shown by evidence that the manufacturers controlled the
sales policies of the markets and the dates of the opening
and closing of the markets through their membership on
the various organizations establishing these policies. The
growers have no representation on such organizations.
The government contended that the fact that the warehousemen do have representation in these organizations
is no protection to the farmer since the investment and
the livelihood of the warehousemen is dependent on the
continued patronage of the large buyers.
(4) Practices of the companies in connection with the
"war" against 10 cigarettes. Government evidence showed
that during the early 1930's certain brands of 106 cigarettes
began to be widely sold and that, as a result, the sales of
the large 15 cigarette manufacturers fell off. As a result
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of this condition the companies entered into a price "war"
to eliminate the competition of the 100 cigarette. While
the major part of this "war" was waged by the weapons of
price to the dealer and retailer certain practices of the companies in respect to leaf buying assisted in eliminating the
10 cigarette competition. The companies were alleged
to have fixed high "ceilings" for the less expensive tobaccos
used by the 10 manufacturers. The manufacturers of the
150 cigarette then entered into competition with the 10¢
manufacturers for the purchase of this tobacco. In this
way, it was contended, the large companies increased the
cost of their competitors and also deprived them of the leaf
they needed for manufacture. The government pointed
out that no satisfactory explanation has ever been made
by the large companies as to the ultimate disposition of this
inferior tobacco.
Verdict of the Jury. This evidence, in respect to leaf
practices, when submitted to the jury along with practices of the companies in connection with sales of tobacco
products, was found by the jury to support the contentions
of the government and resulted in the conviction of the
defendant companies and most of the individual defendants
on three of the counts. 1
Circuit Court of Appeals. The convicted defendants
immediately brought the proceedings necessary for appeal
to the Circuit Court of Appeals. The case was there heard
and opinion rendered on December 8, 1944.2 In the Circuit
Court of Appeals, one of the major issues was whether
there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict of the
jury as to the finding of guilty on each count. In its opinion
the Circuit Court of Apeals reviewed all of the leaf practice evidence which has been discussed with the exception
51 Each of the corporate and the individual defendants was fined the
maximum amount possible under the statute, or $15,000. The trial court
held that the count of the information dealing with attempting to monopolize was merged with the finding of guilty on the count dealing with the
offense of monopolizing so that the defendants were guilty of three counts.
The total of the fines levied in the case against the "Big Three" and their
officers was $255,000. Their annual net profits for the year preceding that
in which the suit was brought were over $75,000,000.
52 American Tobacco Co. v. U. S., 147 F. (2d) 93 (C.C.A. 6th, 1944).
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of the control5 3 of the buyers over the associations that control the loose leaf market. Without mention of this practice, the court held that the other leaf practices in conjunction with the practices of the defendants in respect to the
sales of tobacco products were sufficient to support the
verdicts of the jury in the lower court.
Supreme Court of the United States. The defendants,
having been unsuccessful in the Circuit Court of Appeals,
petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a
writ of certiorarito review the proceedings in the lower
courts. The writ was granted5 4 but was limited to "whether
actual exclusion of competitors is necessary to the crime of
monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act."
While the court emphasized the limitation on the scope of
review by a subsequent refusal 5 to enlarge the scope of
review, the briefs of the defendants and the government
devoted a considerable part of their briefs to a discussion
of the leaf buying practices of the defendants. 0 This proved
to be foresight as the Supreme Court in its opinion rendered on June 12, 1946"' devoted a part of the opinion to the
leaf practices which were found to have contributed to a
plan found violative of the act.
Mr. Justice Burton, speaking for the court, in discussing
the issue of exclusion found that "Although there is no issue
of fact or question as to the sufficiency of the evidence to
be discussed here, nevertheless, it is necessary to summarize the principal facts of that conspiracy to monopolize
certain trade, which was charged in the fourth count."5 8
To that end the Court recounted" the identical leaf buying
practices discussed in the Circuit Court of Appeals; often,
indeed, in the same language. On the sole issue of the
case, that of exclusion, it sustained the conviction upheld
in the court below.
54Ibid., 101 et seq.
5'American Tobacco Co. v. U. S., 324 U. S. 836 (1945).
" Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U. S., 324 U. S. 891 (1945).
56See: Brief for the Respondent, 9-15: Brief for the Petitioner Reynolds
Co., 25-26; Brief for the Petitioner American Tobacco Co., 56-60; Brief
for the Petitioner Liggett & Myers Co., 13-48 (out of a brief of 80 pages),
all in American Tobacco Co. v. U. S., supra, n. 43.
57Supra, n. 43.
38Ibid., 789.
59 Ibid., 789, el aeq.
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Effect of the anti-trust litigation on leaf prices. The
successful prosecution by the government raises the question of the effect of the litigation on future leaf tobacco
prices and the effectiveness of this type of litigation as a
weapon for obtaining increased prices. Action by the government under the Sherman Act presupposes that without
the impediments in the leaf market placed there as a result
of combination among the buyers, a free competitive market would exist. The removal of these obstacles should
then result in higher prices to the producer. The same
paradox in the approach of the federal government under
the Sherman Act may be observed as in the federal legislation now applicable to the loose leaf market. Of course, a
duopoly market is not a free market but tends to be a
monopolistic market where the traditional economic laws
are not controlling, and the removal of these obstructions
would not necessarily tend to increase the price. Price
would still be determined by duopoly.
Oddly, the defense in the Tobacco case made no issue
of the fact that duopoly conditions in the market might
have caused identical prices without collusion among the
buyers.60 Because this fundamental issue was not raised
it may be that the important question remains open of
whether duopoly price, set without agreement, is a violation of the Sherman Act. The argument that the issue is
as yet undetermined must, however, provide small comfort to duopolistic industries, for the refusal of the Supreme
Court to review all issues in the case leaves the government in a position where it may insist that conspiracy may
be inferred from a duopolistic price without regard to the
method by which it is determined.
That such duopoly conditions might have caused the
result found violative of the Sherman Act seems to have
60The issue seems to have been clearly raised in only one Instance
throughout the entire proceedings. Reply Brief of the Petitioner, op. cit.,
supra, n. 43, 6 et seq., "The real question is whether in an industry such
as this, the anti-trust laws are violated by uniformity of conduct, where
normal business factors cause each company, acting individually, to adopt
practices and policies that are, in many instances, similar to those of its
competitors." The failure to argue the issue more vigorously might be
caused by the belief that such an admission on the part of the companies
would be an entering wedge for the government to insist on a more
rigorous type of regulation for the Industry than the anti-trust laws.
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been at least implicitly recognized by the government in
the form in which the suit was brought. Had the government brought a civil suit for the purpose of enjoining the
acts complained of,"' successful prosecution would have
ended in an equity decree. The government undoubtedly
would have been required to assist in the drafting of a
decree which would have "restored" competitive conditions
in the market and which would have set up the framework
for prevention of the recurrence of those conditions resulting in violation of the Sherman Act. The difficulties of
drafting a Canute like decree which would stay the operation of economic forces within the industry must have
been apparent to the officials responsible for the initiation
of the proceedings. It follows that the selection of a criminal proceeding would permit the government to eschew
responsibility for the drafting of a decree which would be
certain to be ineffective. Further, in the event of successful prosecution, the onus of making the adjustments necessary for free competition would then be placed on the industry. Freed of the responsibility for the enforcement
of an ineffectual decree, the government would then be in
a position to insist upon adjustments in the industry under
the threat of future anti-trust prosecutions.
Such, in effect, is the position in which the government
now finds itself. More importantly for the leaf grower, the
responsibility for making the changes necessary to eliminate the economic conditions leading to violation of the
Act is placed with the manufacturer. The interest of the
manufacturer in making such changes may, of course, be
seriously questioned.
What changes, then, will be brought about by the litigation? The necessity for action by the companies to improve
the conditions of the market cannot be said to be impelled
by the penalties provided by the Sherman Act for they
obviously provide no real deterrent to the commission of
61 Although at the time of the conclusion of the case the press indicated
that the government planned to bring a civil action, no official action has
been taken since. See N. Y. Times (Oct. 28, 1941) 25, col. 5. A civil action
for dissolution of the industry would have been confronted with the
problems discussed, infra, circa, n. 63, and would, apparently, have enjoyed no greater success.
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similar offenses. Whatever the impelling cause, it seems
certain that the manufacturers will make some gesture,
even if only for public relations purposes, towards elimination of objectionable features of leaf marketing and the
restoration of "free" market conditions. Some lip service
to the result of the case seems required although both the
government and the industry must recognize that no action
can have a significant effect on leaf prices unless that action
deals with duopoly. The real elimination of duopoly for
the industry would require the substantial increase of the
number of buyers in the market, and, hence of the manufacturers of tobacco products. The annual profits of the
present tobacco manufacturers seem sufficient insurance
against any voluntary step in that direction by the
companies.
In the fixing of revised marketing policies under the
case the manufacturers are without the guidance of a
decree and without the expectation of other assistance
from the government in formulating such policies. 2 Apparently the only guide to the companies are the opinions in
the circuit court of appeals and in the Supreme Court.
The management of the defendants may take the view that
these opinions indicate the minimum scope of reform as
far as marketing practices are concerned. If such an
approach is adopted, the future will probably witness some
alteration of identical leaf price and market sharing practices. If such a course is adopted, the failure of the courts
to stress the other controls exercised by the defendants
over the market may prove a serious omission.
A change in the identical leaf prices may take the form
of a "ceiling" expressed in terms of a range rather than a
set figure. To change the appearance of market sharing
each manufacturer may set a requirement for each market
based on "production" commitments rather than a set percentage. Under duopoly conditions, the Sherman Act
2 In many cases in the past, informal discussion with officials of the antitrust division of the Department of Justice has resulted in agreement on
a course of action that may be safely pursued by a company whose position theretofore was uncertain in respect to possible future prosecution
under the Sherman Act. It would seem that that avenue is foreclosed
to the Tobacco industry.
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prosecution may have the paradoxical result of forcing the
defendants to agree on a course of action to avoid future
prosecutions through giving the appearance of a competitive market while their original conviction may not have
been the result of agreement or concert but because of
economic conditions beyond their control.
In any event, it seems clear that the litigation will noteffect an increase in price nor will it even substantially
effect a change in the practices resulting in the conviction
of the defendants. More importantly, the case reemphasizes the futility of attempts to control the tobacco industry
by Sherman Act litigation. The tobacco trust dissolution
has served only to replace monopoly with duopoly. The
instant tobacco case seems likely to prove even more sterile
in producing significant changes in competitive conditions
within the industry. The only possibility for "restoration"
of competitive conditions in the industry within the framework of the Sherman Act would seem to be a civil litigation for dissolution. In view of the failure of the tobacco
trust dissolution decree, and of the inherent difficulties of
"atomization" of the industry, as later discussed, this, too,
affords at best an uncertain remedy.
The Means of Effective Control. The future of effective
control in the tobacco as well as in those other industries
where "duopolistic" conditions exist calls for recognition
on the part of government that these markets do not respond to the conventional economic stimuli. For the tobacco industry, the conclusion to be drawn is that under
present market conditions no control based upon the assumption of a free market can effect substantial price increases to the farmer. For effective control, then, it seems
clear that one of two fundamentally divergent approaches
from an economic conceptual standpoint must be made.
The first of these approaches would involve increasing the
number of buyers in the market until a free market was
substituted for present "duopoly" conditions. Such an
approach, once a free market is established, depends for
control only on the economic laws applicable to free markets. The second would be based upon a frank recognition
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that the industry is monopolistic and should be treated as a
"public utility" to be operated under price and other controls by the federal government.
The adoption of the first of these possible solutions
requires the elimination of difficult problems inherent in
the creation and maintainence of a market with a sufficient
number of buyers to replace tobacco "duopoly" with a free
market. A brief examination of some of these difficulties
indicates that the possibilities of success for such a project
are somewhat remote.
Increase in the number of buyers. The creation of a
substantially increased number of buyers in the tobacco
market could conceivably be brought about either by the
dissolution of the present companies and the creation of a
number of independent successor units (as was attempted
by the 1911 decree), or by the attraction of a number of
new tobacco manufacturers into the industry as presently
constituted. Of the two, the second would obviously be
the more difficult and offer the lesser chance of success.
The power of the leading tobacco manufacturers and their
hold upon the consumer public through years of extensive
advertising concentrated on brand names is so strong that
it seems unlikely that any sufficient amount of capital could
be attracted into new ventures" in the field of tobacco
manufacturing. It is doubtful that government assistance
through capital aids to new tobacco manufacturing ventures or heavy taxation of the present tobacco manufacturers would neither be successful in drawing new manufacturers into the field nor politically expedient.
Reorganization of the industry to increase the number
of buyers by dissolution of the present manufacturing industry and its rebirth in the form of a number of smaller
units present difficulties of the greatest magnitude. "Atomization," through the dissolution of the present industry into
a sufficient number of units to eliminate "duopoly," would
require the consideration" of such vital problems as (1)
the determination of the number, size and structure of the
"Cox, op. cit., supra, n. 8, 320.

01Hale, Trust Dissolution: "Atomizing" Business Units of Monopolistio
Size, (1940) 40 Col. L. Rev. 615.
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successor units, (2) a disposition of the problem of "brand"
names, (3) an appropriate procedure for effecting such a
dissolution, and (4) a machinery for preserving the freedom of the market once it is achieved.
Number, size and structure of the successor units. Initially it seems clear that a plan for remaking the industry
by increasing the number of manufacturing units must
comprehend the entire industry and not merely a segment.
Such a plan would necessarily include a consideration of
the desirability of reconstituting the manufacturers of
lower priced cigarettes as well as the minor defendant tobacco manufacturers in the tobacco case. The danger of
omitting a segment of the manufacturing industry or of
permitting present companies to remain, without substantial change, in the remade industry is that it would open
the door for such companies to exploit the market through
their experience as a going concern while the balance of
the industry was in the period of readjustment to "atomized" conditions. Such an exploitation could well result
in the continuation of "duopoly" through the replacement
of the present "Big Three" by other, and now much smaller,
manufacturing concerns. Assuming that the entire industry is included in the plan the difficult problems of the
number and size of successor units must be considered.
The problems of number and size are obviously interrelated. Economists give no clear answer to the question
of the number of companies necessary as buyers to eliminate "duopoly". The indication is that the number must
be large. The selection of any number will always bear the
implicit danger that if the number selected is not large
enough "duopoly" will recur in the remade industry. A
determination of the size of the successor units requires a
nice balancing between the danger of the recurrence of
"duopoly" and the necessity for a size adequate for efficient
mass production. The problems are of especial difficulty
in the tobacco industry. The history of the industry is
clear that the most economical size for a manufacturing
enterprise in the tobacco industry is very large, 5 partly
" Cox, op. cit., supra, n. 8, 320.
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because of the advantages of production in a large factory
under mass production methods, and partly because of the
necessity for large scale advertising.
Brand names. An increase of the number of buyer
manufacturing companies would, of course, necessitate the
creation of a number of new manufacturing companies.
Irrespective of the number or size of the successor companies it seems clear that new companies would be at a
competitive disadvantage if the old companies were allowed
to retain their present brand names. To date no court
in effecting a dissolution has undertaken to destroy brand
names. Aside from constitutional doubts under the First,
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the practical problems of such a destruction would be enormous. In addition,
attempts to divide brands in previous dissolutions have
not proved effective. 66
Procedurefor dissolution Dissolution of a "duopolistic"
industry has never been attempted under the Sherman
Act. The provisions of that act as authority for the dissolution of an industry by equity decree have never been
extended beyond "atomization" of a single organization
which had acquired monopolistic control of its field. Even
assuming that the act might be extended to include the dissolution of the "Big Three" in a proper case, the power to
dissolve the manufacturers of the minor competing brands
of 150 cigarettes seems lacking. A fortiorari,it would be
difficult to contend that the provisions of the act were broad
enough to include power to reconstitute non-offenders such
as the manufacturers of the 10 cigarette. The dissolution
of merely a segment of the industry under the Sherman
Act presents dangers that have already been discussed. To
be effective, it seems clear that the entire industry must be
included in any reconstitution plan.
An alternative to the use of the Sherman Act for the
purpose of the dissolution of the present manufacturing
companies into the industrial components necessary to
eliminate duopoly might be presented through special legislation. Even assuming that constitutional doubts could
6 .Muhse, Disintegration of the Tobacco Combination, (1913)
Sci. Q. 249, 268, 275 et seq.; Hale, loc. cit., supra, n. 64.

28 Pol.
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be resolved in favor of such a statute, it seems remote as
a matter of political expediency.
Preservation of a "free" market. The burden of preserving a reconstituted tobacco industry presumably would
fall on the Sherman Act and its enforcement through the
courts by the administrative agencies of the government
charged with responsibility for its enforcement. It is not
within the scope of this paper to discuss the efficacy of
Sherman Act litigation as a device for economic control.
Nevertheless, in view of its history it seems open to serious
question whether the tobacco industry can ever be efficiently controlled by Sherman Act litigation. It is conceivable that a constant vigilance over the industry by an
adequately staffed and well budgeted federal prosecuting
agency 6 7 could maintain the freedom of a market which
had been achieved through dissolution. The normal difficulties of such a surveillance are increased substantially in
the tobacco industry since it is clear that the most efficient
size in that industry is large and pressure is constantly
exerted for increase in the size and the power of individual
units.
A close analysis of the problems involved in the recreation of the industry through dissolution and an attempt
to create competitive conditions in the market leads to
the conviction that such an approach offers no assurance
that competitive conditions can ever be "restored" to an
industry in which such conditions have been unknown for
two generations. Further, any such approach seems certain to result in chaotic leaf market conditions which might
well result in worsening present conditions as to leaf prices.
On the other hand, it is submitted that the "public
utility" approach would avoid most of the problems of
reconstitution of the industry through dissolution, and,
further, from the standpoint of the leaf grower at least,
would eliminate the ultimate problem of uncertainty of
07 Hamilton and Till, Anti-Trust-The Reach after New Weapons (1940)
26 Washington U. L. Q. 1. A more extensive discussion is contained in
Hamilton and Till, Anti-Trust in. Action, National Temporary Economic
Committee, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1941). See also Final Report and
Recommendations of the Temporary National Economic Committee, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess., Sen. Doc. No. 35 (1941) 35.

168

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. IX

the outcome as to leaf price. A fair share of the proceeds
of sale of tobacco products to the consumer can be secured
for the farmer without chaos through a frank recognition
by the federal government that the tobacco industry is
monopolistic and, as in the case of "public utilities," should
be subject to such federal controls as are necessary to insure fair leaf prices to the producer.8 8 A conclusion to
control tobacco leaf prices requires difficult decisions. Not
the least of these is the political problem of overcoming a
natural repugnance to the extension of further federal
control over business.
The problems, however great, do not appear to be
greater than those faced and reasonably well solved in the
case of other industries under federal control. Any less
complete attempt at control in the industry would involve
difficulties at least as great with no assurance of success.
For the leaf grower, it must be concluded that no other
approach can offer a definite assurance of permanently increased leaf prices. Such a conclusion leaves open the
problem of control of prices of tobacco products to the consumer although it seems clear that regulation would have
to be extended to include product prices to avoid the passing on of price increases as the result of leaf price regulation to the consumer. It leaves open, too, the even greater
18 Handler, Book Review, Conipctition in the Amcrican Tobacco Industry

(1934) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 159; Handler, "A. Study of the Construction and
Enforcement of the Federal Anti Trust Laws," Monograph No. 38, Temporary National Economic Committee, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1941) 99-104;
Dickinson, The Anti-Trust Laws and the Self Regulation of Industry,
(1932) 18 A. B. A. J. 600; Jackson, Monlopolies and the Courts, 86 U. of Pa.

L. R. 231; Marchison, Significance of the Anterican Tobacco Company Case
(1948) 26 N. C. L. Rec. 139.
The suggestion is made by Professor Means that it may be possible
to exercise the required degree of control over monopolistic industries
through institutional arrangements in the making of the "right" "key"
decisions. This concept is advanced as a substitute for "economic dictatorship" expressed in terms of government ownership and operation. Professor Means' concept presupposes that competition will inevitable result
when certain obstructive economic influences are regulated. While this
may be true in certain industries, its effective application to an industry
where the entire economic fabric is permeated with "duopoly" is extremely
doubtful. The history of federal attempts at control make it difficult to
conceive of economic features in tobacco leaf marketing which, isolated
and controlled, would alter the structure of the industry sufficiently to
make it competitive. Until a reliable guide to those features has been
furnished, it is not believed that it establishes an effective approach to a
method of leaf price regulation. Means, Industrial PrIces and Their Relative Iniftexibility, Sen. Doc. 13, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
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problems of the need for similar controls in other industries where monopolistic competition flourishes, and the
basic problem of the feasibility of retaining competition as
the instrument of control in some industries while abandoning it in others.
TABLE I
FLUE CuRED TOBACCO: FARM VALUE AND PROFITS OF THE BiG FOUR
ToBAcco MANUFACTURERS, 1923-193T*

Year

1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937

Farm Value
(Million dollars)

121
94

Profits Available for Dividends "Big Four" Tobacco
Manufacturers
(Million dollars)

56
61.7
68.4
70.5
73.6
76.4
85.7
105.2
110.6
104.6
57.7
68.5
68.1
77.2
77.5

115
140
147

128
135
103
56
43

112
152
162
152
197

* From Table 17, p. 84, Transcript of Record in the Supreme Court of the
United States of Mulford v. Smith, 307 U,. S. 38 (1939).

TABLE II
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL U. S. PRODUcTION OF SMALL CIGAETTES

1931-1939*

1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1989
American .........
39.5 36.6 33.0 26.1 24.0 22.5 21.5 22.7 22.9
Liggett ...........
22.7 23.0 28.1 27.4 26.0 24.6 23.6 22.9 21.6
Reynolds ..........
28.4 21.8 22.8 26.0 28.1 29.5 28.1 25.3 23.6
Lorillard ..........
6.5
5.2
4.7
4.1
3.8
4.3
4.7
5.1
5.8
Brown & Williamson
0.2
6.9
5.5
8.3
9.6
9.6
9.9
9.9 10.6
Philip Morris ......
0.9
1.4
0.8
2.0
3.1
4.1
5.4
5.7
7.1
Stephans ..........
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.5
1.4
1.9
2.5
3.1
3.3
Axton Fisher ......
0.7
3.1
4.4
4.4
3.0
2.2
2.4
2.7
2.4
Larus .............
0.2
1.0
0.2
0.6
0.7
0.8
1.0
1.3
1.3
* From American Tobacco Co. v. U. S., 328 U. S. 781, 794 (1946).
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TABLE III
NUMBER OF LOOSE-LEAF MARKETS IN THE UNITED STATES BY CLASSES, AND
NUMBER DESIGNATED FOR AND HAVING INSPECTION UNDER THE INSPECTIoN ACT OF AUGUST 23, 1935, 1936-37 To 1946-47.

Marketing
year

1936-37
1937-38
1938-39
1939-40
1940-41
1941-42
1942-43
1943-44
1944-45
1945-46
1946-47
1936-37
1937-38
1938-39
1939-40
1940-41
1941-42
1942-43
1943-44
1944-45
1945-46
1946-47

Flue-cured'
Total
markets
Total
desigauction
markets nated for
operinspecating
tion
Number Number
74
n6
75
27
75
-8
75
12
75
14
75
26
75
75
75
75
76
75
78
76
79
78
Burley
39
4
40
5
41
12
41
15
42
16
42
42
42
42
42
42
45
45
47
46
48
48

Total
markets
actually
under inspection
Number
3
4
5
212

14
26
42
40
46
53
379
4
5
12
15
16
42
42
42
45
347
48

Fire-cured
Total
markets
Total
desigauction
markets nated for
operinspecating
tion
Number Number
15
13
15
13
14
13
12
14
12
14
12
14
12
14
12
14
11
14
10
14
10
14
Dark air-cured
8
2
9
2
9
3
9
3
8
3
8
7
8
8
8
8
9
9
10
10
10
10

Total
markets
actually
under inspection
Number
13
13
12
12
12
12
12
12
11
10

10
1
2
3
3
3
7
8
8
9
10
10

Maryland'
1936-37
1937-38
2
1938-39
4
1939-40
4
1940-41
4
1941-42
4
1942-43
4
1943-44
4
1944-45
-4
1945-46
4
1946-47
I All flue-cured markets operating, and not previously designated for the
inspection service, were designated for the service on June 26, 1942.
Qualified inspectors have not been available to cover all markets: however.
the service has been extended to some additional markets each season.
During the 1946-47 crop year all flue-cured markets were inspected for the
first time.
2 Three markets, Darlington,
Lake City and Pamplico, S. C. designated
July 1, 1936, but service not inaugurated until the 1939 season.
2 Under the Tobacco Inspection Act it is necessary that a market operate
for one season before being eligible for a referendum. Inspection was furnished on a cost basis on one market.
' Sold in the year following production. No Maryland markets designated to date (12/12/46).
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